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Abstract
Pryor, Andrew W., M.A. July 2005 Economics
Empirical Analysis o f an Augmented Becker Model o f  Criminal Behavior (81 pp.) 
Chairman: Dr. John Wicks
This thesis empirically tests models to identify criminal determinates. The approach is 
a first step in the quantitative evaluation o f strategies designed to eliminate or reduce the 
societal loss associated with crime. Two established models explaining behavior are 
tested. The results o f these models are compared to a model developed and tested in this 
thesis. This model contains both economic and social psychological variables and is 
termed the augmented Becker model.
The individual level o f  the data collected on the unique crime o f copyright infringement 
makes it possible to test all three models; economic theory provides the logical 
framework. The theory is based upon the idea that a criminal considers the benefits and 
costs o f  the crime. Traditionally, changing the size o f the penalty and the probability o f  
its imposition would change the amount o f  crime by changing the individual's 
benefit/cost structure. The use o f individual level data allows inclusion o f respondents’ 
attitudes about music theft and their perception o f what others think as variables. While 
these variables are borrowed from social psychology, they are evaluated in the same 
benefit/cost structure as the economic variables. Statistical tests reveal that the 
augmented Becker model explains music theft better than the other approaches.
The statistical results indicate that chance o f getting caught, changing people’s 
attitudes, societal influences, and age are significant in explaining the probability o f 
music theft. This suggests that marketing efforts to change these variables could be 
compared with policies increasing enforcement to better determine the best course o f 
action. Identifying the cost associated with the manipulation o f significant variables in 
the augmented Becker model is a subject for further study.
Focusing on music theft makes it possible to identify the individual characteristics o f 
those acting in a legal/illegal manner. These individual characteristics, evaluated within 
the framework o f the economics o f crime, are important determinates o f theft. Their 
addition to the model has the potential to enhance available options in the development o f 
policies reducing the broader problem o f criminal behavior.
11
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Chapter 1 
OVERVIEW OF STUDY
Crime is an important economic topic. An empirical estimate o f the yearly cost o f 
crime concluded that the toll is $4,100 on each American or $1.7 trillion for the entire 
economy (Anderson, 1999). The fact that crime places a large burden on the economy 
provides one rationale for its economic study. In addition to this, economics is the study o f 
choice; one aspect o f  crime includes the choice to engage in it. Due to the large amount o f 
societal loss and the strength o f  economic theory in explaining individual choices, economics 
provides a logical framework for evaluating criminal behavior.
This thesis is primarily concerned with the evaluation o f  the choice to engage in a 
criminal behavior. Understanding why individuals choose to engage in criminal behavior is 
elemental to developing strategies aimed at reducing the damage the behavior causes. 
Economic theory, as proposed by Gary Becker, a University o f  Chicago economist and 
Nobel laureate, provides the foundation for the empirical analysis presented in this thesis. 
Becker’s model explains how rational individuals, evaluating whether or not to engage in a 
criminal act, weigh the expected chance o f getting caught and the cost o f the expected 
penalty against the expected gains from the act. The standard economic decision rule 
applies: i f  benefits outweigh costs the behavior is undertaken. From its behavioral 
underpinnings, the model explains how policy makers can influence the crime rate by 
changing the probability an individual gets caught (e.g., increased expenditures on police) or
1
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by changing the penalty (e.g., increased fines, prison terms, etc.). The model provides for the 
useful evaluation o f  policy alternatives.
W hile the quantitative nature o f  economics is helpful in assessing optimal policies, 
economics does not hold a monopoly on the academic study o f choice and is by no means the 
dominant discipline for the study o f  criminal behavior. Because o f this, the analysis o f 
choice presented here is based upon an economic framework but also relies on literature and 
research from diverse fields.
Academic disciplines contributing to this analysis include the fields o f social 
psychology, marketing, sociology, and criminology. A particular emphasis is placed upon 
theoretical and empirical work from the field o f social psychology. Research within this 
field led to the development o f behavioral models. Among the preeminent models is Martin 
Fishbien and Icek A jzen’s Theory o f Reasoned Action. This theory explains how overt 
behavior is related to attitudes and pressure from peers. Basically, someone who feels 
positively about an activity and who has strong social motivation toward it will participate in 
the activity. The Theory o f  Reasoned Action is not specific to criminal behavior; however, it 
possesses usefulness in explaining this type o f behavior. For example, it is likely that a 
person evaluating whether or not to participate in a crime would base this decision, in part, 
on what those important to her (e.g. friends, family, co-workers, etc.) think about the criminal 
behavior. Compelling evidence exists that behavior is unmistakably altered simply by the 
immediate or anticipated presence o f  others (Milgram, 1965), thus other people play a large 
role in determining individuals’ behaviors. This example shows how variables from the 
Theory o f  Reasoned Action might be important determinates o f criminal behavior and 
demonstrates one reason for the inclusion o f  diverse disciplines in this thesis.
2
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Economie theory provides the foundation for the empirical work presented in this 
thesis. M ore specifically, the criminal decision is evaluated within the framework o f  utility 
maximization. According to this framework, individuals making the decision to steal have 
weighed all o f  the expected costs and benefits, and expect the benefits to be greater. The 
traditional economic approach described above identifies two major variables that affect 
expected utility. They are the chance o f  getting caught and the penalty. This thesis theorizes 
and empirically tests the idea that the variables identified in the Theory o f  Reasoned Action -  
attitudes and social influences -  also affect the expected utility o f  engaging in a criminal 
behavior. It is hypothesized that the Becker variables impose real expected costs (e.g. fine, 
imprisonment, death, etc.), while the variables from the Theory o f  Reasoned Action impose 
“psychic” costs (e.g. guilt, shame, spurn, etc.). The possible advantage to this approach, 
termed the augmented Becker model, is the wider range o f options available to those 
interested in reducing crime. For example, marketing efforts designed to change attitudes 
might prove a more cost effective strategy to reducing crime than increasing the penalty.
While this theory holds promise for expanding the economic explanation o f  criminal 
behavior, it cannot be tested as suggested by Becker. That is, aggregate level data cannot be 
used. Because there are no aggregate measures o f  attitudes and peer pressure; data for these 
variables must be collected individually. Collecting individual level data on criminal 
behavior presents some problems. It is important to select a criminal behavior that is 
widespread and that people feel comfortable discussing. This helps to ensure accuracy and a 
large sample size. Music theft provided an ideal crime for survey data. The reasons for this 
include the fact that 25 percent o f Americans ages 12 and older currently own a PC-based 
Compact Disc Recorder/Burner. Further, 12 percent reported they have copied a pre-recorded
3
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music CD owned by someone else rather than actually purchasing that particular CD (Ispos, 
2003). A 2003 estimate showed that music-swapping services now attract 40 million users in 
the United States alone (Ispos, 2003). Due to the proliferation o f  computer users and their 
access to the technology enabling theft, illegal music acquisition was the crime chosen in 
which to collect data on.
Logistical regression provides the basis for the analysis o f  this thesis. This is due to 
the effectiveness o f the logistical regression in analyzing models with binary dependent 
variables (e.g. legal/illegal behavior). In this case, the logit explains how independent 
variables affect the probability o f illegal behavior. Separate regressions are run to test three 
models o f behavior. The models are the economic model proposed by Becker, the Theory o f 
Reasoned Action and the augmented Becker. Each model contains two or more significant 
independent variables and fit the data reasonably well. These results suggest that each model 
could fit the data reasonably be used to explain music theft. Closer inspection, however, 
reveals the augmented Becker outperforms the other models. The logistical regression run on 
the augmented Becker model provides evidence that chance o f getting caught, attitudes, 
societal influences and age o f  the respondent are all significant in explaining music theft.'
The significance o f  the augmented Becker model allows for quantitative evaluation o f  
policy options that are not possible using the traditional economic approach. Implementation 
o f policy suggested by the augmented Becker model could prove more cost effective. For 
example, the results o f  the Becker model presented here suggest that chance o f getting caught 
affects the probability that one will engage in music theft. Increasing enforcement o f the 
laws might increase the chance o f getting caught and thus decrease the probability o f  theft.
' The variable names are Caught, Attitude, Norms (peer pressure) and Age. Norms represent a proxy for 
subjective norms as described in the literature chapter.
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More enforcement requires more resources; however this may not be the best use o f  these 
resources. The augmented Becker model suggests that the probability o f crime can also be 
decreased by changing people’s attitudes and societal influences. Marketing efforts to 
change these variables might be more cost effective than increasing enforcement. This 
example illustrates how the augmented Becker model provides more options for the 
implementation o f  potentially effective strategies aimed at reducing the broader problem o f 
theft and the losses associated with it.
The results o f  this thesis provide a first step in quantifying policy alternatives related 
to theft. Identifying the cost associated with the manipulation o f  significant variables in the 
augmented Becker model is a subject for ftirther study. Other topics for further study include 
testing the augmented Becker model on other criminal behaviors and testing whether current 
attempts to change attitudes and societal influences affect the probability o f  criminal 
behavior. Assuming results o f  future studies o f criminal behavior are consistent with the 
results presented here, the additional variables o f the augmented Becker model are likely to 
produce policies that are improve the cost effectiveness o f preventing losses associated with 
criminal behaviors.
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Chapter 2 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Criminal behavior is widespread, diverse and costly to society. Because o f  this, all o f 
the social sciences contain at least some literature explaining and analyzing criminal 
behavior. The wide range o f  literature is likely due to the fact that crime touches everyone; a 
better understanding o f crime might result its reduction. W hile scholarly works from diverse 
social sciences were consulted in the development o f  this thesis, the theory proposed in 
Chapter 3 relies heavily upon the contributions o f economics and social psychology. This 
chapter presents criminal behavior within the context o f  each discipline. Economics is 
covered in section 2.1 and social psychology is discussed in section 2.2.
2.1 Economic Perspective
This section presents the economic perspective o f theft behavior. First, 
subsection 2.1.1 describes the economic framework o f crime. This discussion includes 
the distributional effects and the efficiency losses associated with theft. Second, 
subsection 2.1.2 summarizes the economic theory developed by Gary S. Becker. The 
theory explains theft behavior in economic terms, with an emphasis on minimizing the 
efficiency loss associated with theft. Subsections 2.1.3, 2.1.4, and 2.1.5 examine the 
empirical work based upon Becker’s theory. Lastly, subsection 2.1.6 discuses some 
criticisms o f the Becker approach to crime.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2.1.1 The Distributional and Efficiency Effects of Theft
W ithin the theoretical framework o f  economics crime can have two effects, 
transferring or redistributing wealth and decreasing efficiency.^ These effects are best 
explained with an analogy. Consider an economy to be like a giant pie. Transfers and 
redistributions change who gets what piece; efficiency determines the size o f the pie. 
W hile some crimes redistribute wealth, most crimes reduce efficiency. Thus, criminal 
behavior results in a smaller pie. This problem is the focus o f  economic theory regarding 
crime.
Efficiency losses occur when market forces do not reflect the entire benefits or 
costs associated with a transaction. In the case o f theft this occurs in four situations. 
They are: (1) opportunity cost o f the labor o f  thieves, (2) loss o f  time and money by 
potential victims and the state in deterrence, (3) destruction o f the product or property in 
the act and (4) re-direction o f  production into activities that cannot be stolen (Usher, 
1987, p.236). Each o f  these situations does not occur with every theft; however, each has 
important implications within the framework o f  the economic model o f crime presented 
in subsection 2.1.2.
Efficiency losses furnish a quantifiable means o f  evaluating criminal behavior, 
which leads to the perception that economics overlooks the personal physical and 
emotional consequences o f  criminal behaviors such as violence, suffering and a loss o f 
personal safety. The ideal reduction o f efficiency losses associated with criminal 
behaviors includes these factors. Thus, through the study o f efficiency, it is possible to 
reduce problems not generally associated with economics. The economic study o f  crime
* The market generates “efficient” allocation o f resources if  there does not exist an alternative feasible 
resource allocation that can make some individual better o ff without making someone else worse off.
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provides a framework for the reduction o f  all efficiency losses. The desired result o f  such 
studies is an increase in the size o f the pie.
2.1.2 Economic Theory: Becker
The question o f  how to minimize the efficiency loss due to theft was first taken up 
in Gary S. Becker’s 1968 work Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. This 
model “formulates a measure o f the social loss from offenses and finds those 
expenditures o f resources and punishments that minimize this loss” (p. 170). The model 
suggests that policy makers can minimize social loss through the manipulation o f  two 
variables; offender cost and probability o f conviction per offence.
Becker posited that the efficiency losses attributable to crime could be minimized 
through the use o f incentives and punishments. To help explain how theft works in an 
economic system Becker developed a set o f  behavioral equations explaining crime and its 
related costs. The equations explain: (1) net damage to society; (2) the cost o f 
apprehension and conviction; (3) the supply o f offences; (4) and punishment. These 
equations form (5) the optimality conditions needed to minimize societal loss.
1. Damage
Becker believed that crime caused damage to society related to the number o f 
offences (O) in the following functional form.
D (0 ) = H (0 ) -  0 ( 0 )  (2.1)
Where,
D = damages f(0 )
H = harm to the victim f(0)
G = gains to the criminal f(0 )
8
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This formula is intended to  capture all costs and benefits associated with the 
criminal act. In this model damages include not only pecuniary costs but psychic costs as 
well. An example o f  a psychic cost is the loss o f  safety a person feels after being a victim 
o f a crime The fact that these costs are included in the model suggests that many studies 
whose results are based upon the monetary cost o f  crime underestimate the actual cost.
2. The Cost o f  Apprehension and Conviction
The cost o f  apprehension and conviction is expressed by the production function 
A (Activity)=f(m,r,c), i.e. manpower, materials, and capital used in capturing criminals. 
The total cost is expressed as:
C=C(A) (2.2)
For a better empirical measure o f  “activity” Becker assumed that (p) the ratio o f  the 
probability a person gets convicted to all offences multiplied by the number o f  offences 
approximated the output o f  police and courts. This function is:
A~pO (2.3)
Becker substitutes equation 2.3 into equation 2.2 differentiates and gets:
Cp =  =  C 'o >  0 (2.4)
and
Cq =  C'p >  0 (2.5)
These equations explain how, as long as probability o f  offence (p (0 )) is greater than zero, 
the increase in the probability o f conviction or number o f  offences increases the total cost 
to  society o f  the crime.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3. Supply o f  offences
Economic theory explains that a rational person will engage in the action with the 
highest expected utility. This is known as utility maximization. For a person operating 
within the framework o f  utility maximization, legal behavior should not be taken for 
granted. Theoretically, utility optimizers will choose to engage in an action that they feel 
best suits them regardless o f  the legality o f  the action. Thus, i f  a person commits an act 
o f theft it is presumed that she does so because her expected utility, or reward, from the 
act outweighs the alternatives. This assumption, that crime represents a possible optimal 
allocation o f a person’s resources, allowed Becker to develop a function that explains 
why people steal. It follows the form:
0=0(p,f,u) (2.6)
Where,
O = the number o f offences a person commits in a specific time period
p = the probability o f  conviction per offence
f  = the individual’s punishment per offence
u = a portmanteau variable representing “all other influences”^
In this model only a convicted person pays. Raising the probability o f conviction 
or increasing the punishment per offence decreases the number o f offences carried out 
per period. This is explained by the following partial derivatives;
Op= dOldp < 0 (2.7)
and
O f = ô O / a f < 0  (2.8)
 ̂Becker suggests education or a rise in the income available in legal activities as possible “u” variables.
10
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An increase in either p or f  would reduce the number o f  offences because either the 
“price” would be higher or the probability o f “paying” the higher “price” would be 
greater. This works by changing the individual’s expected utility function. The utility is: 
EU=pU(Y-f)+(l-p)U(Y) (2.9)
Where,
Y = income, monetary and psychic from an offence 
U = the individual’s utility function 
f  = the monetary equivalent o f  the punishment^
This function shows how increases in p and f  result in a decrease in expected utility. It 
also shows how a change in the probability o f  punishment and a change in penalty that 
result in equal expected income do not have the same effect on the individual. Because 
the change in the probability has a greater effect on the expected utility o f the individual, 
a change in this variable will theoretically cause a greater reduction in crime.
These equations show how individuals choose to “supply” criminal behavior. The 
equations follow the econom ists’ analysis o f choice in describing how a person commits 
an offence. The proposition is that people decide to become criminals because their costs 
and benefits differ; they expect crime to pay.
4. Punishment
Punishments cost both the th ief and society. The only direct monetary measure o f
punishments is fines. In this case, the cost o f  administration is subtracted from the fine
resulting in the net societal cost o f the punishment. It is apparent that fines can have net 
social benefits, however many punishments cost society. For example, imprisonment
The effects o f  punishment are discussed further in part 4 o f this subsection.
11
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costs society directly through expenditures on prisons. It indirectly costs society through 
the forgone earnings o f  the criminal and the loss o f the value placed upon restrictions in 
consumption and freedom o f  the convicted. The total social cost o f  the punishments is 
described by:
f '- b f  (2.10)
Where,
f  = social cost
f  = cost to offender
b = the coefficient that transforms f  to f  '
Becker believes that the coefficient b that transforms f  into f  ' varies greatly for different 
kinds o f punishments. He believes that b=0 for fines, while b> l for torture, probation, 
parole, imprisonment, and most other punishments.
5. Optimality Conditions
W ith the behavior equations in place Becker was able to answer the question o f 
how m any resources to expend to minimize the efficiency loss associated with theft, at
least theoretically, by combining them all into the functional form of;
L=L(D ,C,bf,0) or L -D (O ) + C (p ,0)+ bpf0  (2.11)
Where,
L = social loss
D = net damage from the act o f  theft
C = cost o f apprehension
b f  = offender costs
12
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p = probability o f  conviction per offence
O = occurrences o f crime
This model suggests that policy makers can minimize social loss only through changes in 
offender costs (f) and the probability o f conviction per offence (p). A greater expenditure 
on police, courts, technology, and other measures increases the probability that a thief 
gets caught. Increases in the sizes o f the punishments (i.e. higher fines or more prison 
time) cause decreases in crime. The marginal costs associated with the decrease in crime 
must be weighed against the marginal benefits o f the decreased in crime. According to 
this theory, finding the best combination o f these costs and benefits determines how to 
minimize efficiency losses due to criminal behavior.
2.1.3 Economic Empirical Work: Ehrlich
An economist who has contributed to the empirical testing o f  the economic theory 
o f theft is Isaac Ehrlich.^ His 1973 work, Participation in Illegal Activities: A 
Theoretical and Empirical Investigation, supports Becker’s theory. Ehrlich begins his 
analysis with a discussion o f  what he calls the “criminal prospect.” Ehrlich believes that 
the criminal prospect has a choice to violate the law or to remain law abiding. If  a 
violation occurs the offender has two probable outcomes: getting away or getting caught. 
The first outcome produces an increase in wealth, while the second entails a penalty.^
Based upon the Becker approach, Ehrlich’s models include the idea that an 
increase in probability o f  getting caught and punishment once caught affect the decision
 ̂His works on criminal behavior include: Insurance, Protection from  Risk, and Risk-Bearing, 1985; On the 
Issue o f  Causality in the Economic Model o f  Crime and Law Enforcement: Some Theoretical 
Considerations and Experimental Evidence, 1987; Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical 
and Empirical Investigation, 1973; Crime, Punishment, and the Market fo r  Offenses. 1996.
* This includes a psychic income component both positive and negative.
13
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o f whether or not to engage in a criminal activity. Ehrlich believes that there is another 
important variable, the marginal value o f time, and proposed the following modified 
model:
0=0(p ,f,W j,W i,U ,7t) (2 .12)
Where,
O = Number o f  Offences
P
f
Wi
Wi
u
n
= Probability o f  getting caught 
= Offender Costs (punishments)
= The marginal value o f  time devoted to illegal activities 
= The marginal value o f  time devoted to legal activities 
= error term
= “other variables” including such things as “personal family
wealth, efficiency at self-protection, the amount o f private
insurance provided by his family (or criminal
organization)” (p. 533)
Ehrlich tested this model empirically using data from the Uniform Crime Reports
o f the FBI on crimes committed in the United States from 1960, 1950, and 1940. After
running regression analysis on the data Ehrlich concludes:
The rate o f  specific crime categories . . . varies inversely 
with estimates o f  the probability o f  apprehension and 
punishment by imprisonment, and with average length o f 
time served in state prisons. Crimes against property are 
also found to vary positively with the percentage o f 
families below one ha lf the median income (crimes against 
the person are not affected by 
income).(p. 549)
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The significance o f  these results lends support to economic model o f crime 
developed by Becker and supplemented by Ehrlich. The model suggests that through the 
use o f  punishments, changes in the probability o f  getting caught, and the increasing 
marginal value o f time devoted to legal activities (i.e. better employment), it is possible 
to affect the crime rate.
2.1.4 Economic Empirical Work: Corman-Mocan
The pioneering work by Becker and Ehrlich paved the way for the economic 
study o f  crime. There have been many attempts to test the model empirically. Gorman 
and Mocan use time-series data to test a model based upon Becker’s theory. While the 
Corman-Mocan model is conceptually similar to Becker’s they have added a proxy legal 
market opportunity and a variable for drug use. The model is expressed:
CR=f(Pol,Arr,Pov,Q) (2.13)
Where,
CR = the crime rate
Pol = the size o f the police force
Arr = criminal arrests
Pov = poverty (a proxy o f  legal market opportunity)
Q = drug use
The authors test this model with data provided by the city government o f  New 
York. The data is a time series with an entry for every month from 1970-1996. Five 
types o f  crime were investigated including murder, assault, robbery, burglary, and motor 
vehicle theft.
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For all five categories, a significant relationship was found between growth in the 
crime rate and number o f  police. Drug use had a small effect, and the poverty/market 
opportunity variable was not significant. These results support Becker’s thesis that an 
increase in the probability o f  getting caught (more police) will cause a decrease in the 
crime rate.
2.1.5 Economie Empirical Work: Cornwell-Trumbull
Many studies have found a significant relationship exists between increases in the 
offender costs and probability o f  conviction with reduced crime rate (Ehrlich, 1975; 
Witte, 1980; Viscusi, 1986; Grogger, 1991; Levitt, 1997; Corman and Mocan 2000). 
Other studies have found either weak or nonexistent relationships between the variables 
(Myers, Jr., 1983; Cornwell and Trumbull, 1994). The following paragraphs examine a 
study by Comwell-Trumbull that casts doubt on the robustness o f  the empirical results 
pertaining to the economic theory o f  crime.
Cornwell and Trumbull base their study on the economic model o f crime. It is 
specified as follows:
R=X’p+P’y+a+e (2.14)
Where,
R  = the crime rate
X' = variables controlling for the relative return to legal opportunities
P’ = a set o f  deterrent variables including probability o f arrest,
conviction and prosecution 
a  = fixed effects (cross sectional model only)
8 = disturbance terms
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Based upon the statistical analysis o f  this model the authors conclude that 
previous studies using aggregate data might be flawed due to misspecification. 
Unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity are some statistical consequences o f using 
aggregate data in studies o f crime. Controlling for these problems, this model is tested 
using panel and cross sectional data. In addition, a two stage least squares regression is 
used. The data and the statistical techniques led the authors to conclude that the 
probability o f arrest does not provide as much deterrence as previous studies indicated.
These results bring to light potential problems o f the economic approach to 
criminal behavior. Most o f these problems occur due to the aggregate data used in past 
studies. According to the authors, using data o f this type introduces endogeneity. This 
specification error biases upward deterrent effects estimates, therefore any study that fails 
to specify the model correctly risks reporting erroneous results.
2.1.6 Criticisms of the Economic Theory of Crime
As the Comwell-T rumbull study indicates problems exist when empirically 
testing the economic model o f  crime. Four principal criticisms exist. (1) Spurious 
correlation between the crime rate dependent variable and criminal enforcement variables 
might be due to measurement errors. (2) Criminal enforcement levels and crime rates 
may be simultaneous leading to an identification problem. (3) The variable for “crimes 
cleared by conviction” represents many crimes and the mix of crimes is affected by 
criminal enforcement efforts. (4) The potential gains to the criminal have not been 
adequately studied or specified in the models. These criticisms bring to light important 
issues that will require further study. Nevertheless, a majority o f empirical work 
involving the economics o f  criminal behavior supports the efficacy o f  the model.
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2.2 Social Psychological Perspective
In the field o f  social psychology it was originally believed that a person’s attitude 
toward the act in question was the best way to explain behaviors. Through the course o f 
time and examination o f  data, a general consensus grew: explaining behavior from 
attitude is unreliable. This consensus initiated the search for other variables important to 
explaining behavior. The search led to the incorporation o f  societal influences or norms 
in explaining behavior culminating in the Theory o f  Reasoned Action.
The evolution o f  behavioral research is discussed in subsection 2.2.1. Subsection
2.2.2 explains the Theory o f  Reasoned Action (TORA). Finally, subsection 2.2.3 
concludes the chapter with a critical look at the ability o f  the TORA to explain behavior.
2.2.1 Development of Behavior Research
The possibility that attitude might explain behavior was evident from an early 
point in the social sciences. In 1918 Thomas and Znaniecki (Thomas, 1918) first used 
the concept o f  attitude to explain social behavior. The pair believed attitudes or 
“individual mental processes” determined people’s actual and potential responses to 
different situations. This idea remains integral to many behavioral theories; however, 
studies done since suggest that attitude, as the sole explanatory variable o f behavior, 
performs poorly.
One o f  the first researchers to question the explanatory power o f attitudes was
LaPiere (1938). He disagreed with the assumption that the response given to a printed or
oral question reveals the attitude which would become operative in a situation o f the kind
referred to in that question stating: “The measurement o f attitude as a means o f predicting
future behavior . . . [is] scientific nonsense” (p. 179). His investigation focused on the
18
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consistency between the treatment o f a Chinese couple in hotels and restaurants and the 
replies by owners o f  such establishments to a questionnaire about their acceptance o f 
Chinese in general. He found virtually no consistency. Taking an interest in results o f 
this experiment Kutner, W ilkins and Yarrow (1952) attempted to repeat it. Their results 
also showed no correlation between attitudes and behaviors. Based upon a survey o f  the 
previously discussed works along with other similar works from the period Deutscher 
(1966) argued that there was no reason to expect that attitude explains any behavior.
Despite unimpressive results regarding the attitude-behavior relationship, theorists 
interested in explaining behavior continued to believe that attitude played a key role. In 
time, it became generally accepted that attitude was responsible for only a small portion 
o f behavior (Wicker, 1969). Freedman, Carlsmith, and Sears (1970) believed that 
attitude or change in attitude tends to produce behavior that corresponds with it. They 
qualified this thought with the idea that the attitude-behavior relationship depends on 
other variables that caused an inconsistency between the relationship.
One o f the variables thought to cause this inconsistency was termed normative 
forces. W hen investigating marijuana use, Acock and Defleur (1972) found that attitude 
along w ith normative beliefs provided excellent explanation o f behavior. The insight into 
the normative variables influence on behavior proved essential to the development o f one 
o f the most influential models o f behavior, the Theory o f  Reasoned Action. A discussion 
o f this theory follows in subsection 2.1.2.
2.2.2 Behavior Explanation: Theory of Reasoned Action
In 1975, based on previous behavioral studies, Fishbein and Ajzen developed the 
Theory o f  Reasoned Action (TORA). This theory remains the dominant theoretical
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framework for explaining behavior within the field o f social psychology. This is 
demonstrated by its use in countless studies including: blood donation (Bagozzi 1981; 
and Chamg, Piliavin, and Callero 1988), recycling (Schultz and Oskamp 1996), 
substance abuse (Grube and Morgan 1990), voting (Granberg and Holmberg 1990), and 
weight loss (Netemeyer, et al, 1991).
Understanding the TORA requires the knowledge o f the variables theorized to 
influence behavior as well as how those variables are measured. The following 
paragraphs begin with the mathematical construct o f  the TORA and a b rief definition o f 
the variables. The functional form o f  the TORA will guide a more detailed discussion o f 
each variable in turn. The equation for the TORA follows the form:
B * f(BI) = f(Aact, SN ) (2 .15)
Where,
B = behavior
BI = behavioral intention
SN = subjective norms
Aact = attitude toward performing the specific act in question
Because B«BI the TORA does not explain behavior (B) per se, it explains behavioral
intentions (BI). The construct called behavioral intentions is linked to actual behavior
through “effort” or “the attempt to perform the behavior” (Ajzen, 1985, p.30). For
example a lazy person might have the behavioral intention to get o ff the couch (i.e.
survey results suggest she wants to get o ff the couch), yet if  no effort is expended the
behavior will not come to fruition. This example shows how the theory explains
behavior intentions; however, it is important to realize that these intentions do not always
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result in the expected behavior. The fact that the model explains behavioral intentions, 
not actual behavior, is one o f  its major criticisms; this is discussed in subsection 2.2.4.
Attitude toward performing the specific act in question (Aact) is the next variable 
o f interest. This variable comes from the following equation:
Aact= Z Pi at (2.16)
The variable Pj represents the individual’s belief about the likelihood that the behavior in 
question will result in outcome i. This could also be thought o f as the individual’s 
perceived probability that a consequence - either positive or negative -  will arise from the 
act in question. The variable a; represents the individual’s evaluation o f the outcome o f i 
or, put another way, the variable represents the perceived consequence o f  the act 
(Fishbein, 1978).
Generally semantic differential or Likert scales are employed to discover the 
variables associated with attitude (Aact) as well as subjective norms (SN). For example, a 
person might be asked to respond to a question regarding her interest in sports. A 
semantic differential might have the following response options, very interested, 
somewhat interested, or not at all interested. A Likert scale might ask the respondent to 
evaluate her interest on a scale from one to ten, ten being very interested. Fishbein 
employed the following semantic differential scales in his 1972 study measuring the 
effects o f buying a plot o f  land as: foolish-wise, good-bad, harmful-beneficial, rewarding- 
punishing. The sum across the four scales was then used for attitude (Aact) (Ajzen and 
Fishbein, 1972).
The addition o f  the variable for subjective norms (SN) is an attempt to quantify 
how the individual in question will react to what she perceives to be the expectation o f
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her behavior by those around her and her desire to comply with those expectations. 
Normative forces affect behavior in two ways. First, groups exert influence on 
individuals by affecting sources o f  information and how they evaluate it. Second, groups 
assert their influence on individuals’ perception o f the way they should behave. The 
variable subjective norms (SN) is an attempt to capture “peer pressure” on the 
individual’s behavior and takes the following form:
SN=S(nb*mc) (2.17)
Where,
nb = normative beliefs
me = motivation to comply with the normative beliefs 
Defined by Fishbein and Ajzen (1980) normative beliefs (nb) are subjective, that is, a 
person’s “perception that most people who are important to him think he should or should 
not perform the behavior in question” (p. 57). The motivation to comply (me) with the 
normative beliefs (nb) represents the individual’s desire to live up to the expectations o f 
those around her.
The model calls for summing the multiple o f all normative beliefs (nb) by their 
respective motivation to comply (me). For example, a person responds to a survey that 
she respects grandma’s opinion (nb), she also makes a strong effort to comply with 
grandma’s opinion (me). This same person respects the opinion o f her friends, yet she 
makes a smaller effort to comply with these opinions. The Likert scale results for strong 
respect and motivation to comply with grandma’s beliefs would be multiplied together. 
Then they would be added to the Likert scale results o f  strong respect and weaker 
motivation to comply with friends’ beliefs multiplied together. The resulting number
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would represent the individual’s subjective norms regarding a specific behavior. 
Theoretically this is possible; however, in practice the variable for motivation to comply 
(me) is difficult to quantify and is usually dismissed. (Azjen and Fishbein, 1980). 
Nevertheless, these variables provide an excellent explanation o f behavior demonstrated 
by the use o f  the Theory o f  Reasoned Action in m any behavioral studies.
2.2.3 Criticisms of the Theory of Reasoned Action
W hile successes in explaining behavior with the TORA have occurred, there 
remain criticisms o f  the theory. These criticisms center upon the imprecise link between 
behavior (B) and behavioral intention (BI) resulting in a reduced range o f behaviors that 
can be explained using the theory. According to Liska (1984), there are two major 
problems with the theory: (1) The theory is only good at explaining simple tasks, and (2) 
the theory only explains behaviors that immediately follow the administration o f the 
survey. Following is a discussion o f  these two problems.
The idea that the TORA does a better job explaining simple behaviors involves 
the relationship of behavior (B) to behavioral intention (BI). Presumably an individual’s 
“effort” can be enough to transform a behavioral intention (BI) into a behavior (B). 
However, effects o f effort change as behavioral complexity increases. The assistance o f 
others and external constraints change the required effort. The more complex the 
behavior the less likely effort will transform a behavior (B) into a behavioral intention 
(BI) (Wright, 1998).
The other criticism o f  the theory, the inability o f  the TORA to explain behaviors 
that do not transpire shortly after the completion o f  the survey, is due to the instability o f 
behavioral intentions over time. Eagly and Chaiken (1992) state that the TORA has
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“largely abandoned the question o f how intentions relate over broad time spans to 
behaviors.” Fishbein and Ajzen note that maximizing the effectiveness o f the TORA 
requires that researchers minimize the time interval between the measurement o f 
intentions and behavior (1978).
The TORA is somewhat limited in the behaviors it can explain. Its limits include 
behaviors that are relatively simple and behaviors occurring shortly after the intention is 
reported. Empirically examining behaviors with the TORA requires addressing these 
limits. As mentioned, past studies have shown that when the limits are taken into account 
the TORA can provide a useful approach to the explanation o f behavior.
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Chapter 3 
THEORIES OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR
The literature chapter discussed two distinct models o f explaining criminal 
behavior. The model presented by Becker offers an economic perspective, while the 
Theory o f Reasoned Action offers a social psychology viewpoint. Both theories offer 
insight into the causes o f  criminal behavior. Becker’s economic theory is influenced by 
the econom ists’ emphasis on the interplay o f individual choices {Hisrchleifer, 1998). The 
social psychology perspective explains how behavior is influenced by individual attitudes 
and the actual, imagined or implied presence o f  others (Albrecht, 1980). The previous 
chapter cites empirical evidence supporting the explanatory power o f both models.
In this chapter, each theory is described in similar terms. There follows a 
discussion o f  the similarities and differences between the theories and their disciplines. 
The fact that each separately adds to the understanding o f criminal behavior argues for 
combining the contributions o f  each into a synthesized theory. This synthesis takes the 
form o f a Becker model augmented with variables from the Theory o f  Reasoned Action. 
This synthesis will be called the augmented Becker model.
3.1 The Becker Model
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Becker model o f crime assumes that 
criminals are rational individuals maximizing their utility. It is assumed that criminals 
deciding on the best course o f action evaluate both the expected income foregone by
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devoting time to criminal activity and the expected value o f  the return from the activity, 
i.e. the costs and benefits. The standard economic decision rule applies: i f  benefits 
outweigh costs the behavior is undertaken.
According to the theory, if  expected utility is positive, crime pays. To eliminate 
crime, policy makers must manipulate the variables o f the expected utility function so 
that expected utility from crime is zero or less for all members o f a society. 
Unfortunately, due to varying opportunity costs, the high cost o f  punishment, and the 
high cost o f increasing punishm ent’s probability, achieving zero or negative utility for all 
members o f  society would be very difficult - not to mention costly. Therefore, according 
to Becker, it is important to find a level o f crime that “should” be allowed in order to 
minimize the societal loss associated with crime. Policy makers can do this by 
manipulating the level o f m oney spent on policing and punishing, thereby affecting the 
expected cost o f  crime.
3.2 The Theory of Reasoned Action
Independent o f  the economists, social psychologists developed models to explain
social behavior. One o f  the most widely cited techniques developed by social
psychologists is the Theory o f Reasoned Action. According to the theory intention to
perform a behavior is a function o f  two basic determinants, one personal in nature and the
other reflecting social influence. The personal factor is the individual’s positive or
negative evaluation o f  performing the behavior; this factor is termed attitude toward the
behavior. It refers to the person’s judgm ent that performing the behavior is good or bad.
For example some may have a favorable opinion o f music downloading while others do
not. The second determinate o f  behavioral intention is the person’s perspective o f the
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social pressures put on her to perform or not perform the behavior in question. Because 
it deals with forces that are perceived, this factor is termed a subjective norm.
The implications o f  this model are straightforward. I f  a causal relationship exists 
between the dependant variable on the one hand and the independent variables on the 
other, then it might be possible to reduce crime by changing people’s attitudes and norms. 
For instance, marketing efforts could be focused on changing these variables.
3.3 Similarities and Differences of the Models
Both the economic and the social psychological perspectives are concerned with 
explaining behavior. However, because the conception o f each model arose from 
different academic disciplines, the two models vary in their approaches to explaining 
behavior. Economics provides a theoretical base for the decision-making process through 
the concept o f  utility maximization. In social psychology attitudes, primitive instincts 
reinforced or repressed by socialization, cultural characteristics, group identifications, 
and evolution are potential determinates o f behavior.
An economist assumes that an individual’s decisions reflect attempts to achieve 
desired tastes and preferences. This is the basis o f the economic theory on crime as it 
posits that people are making a choice based upon whether or not it adds to their utility. 
The discipline of social psychology contains no universally accepted or assumed 
motivation to behave in a particular way. In this case, an individual makes behavioral 
choices based upon her beliefs, attitudes and social forces. Thus, an economist might 
describe an individual’s choice to eat a burger as maximizing the individual’s happiness. 
A social psychologist would suggest that social forces (like not being Hindi) and the fact
that the individual likes burgers resulted in her consumption o f the burger.
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3.4 The Augmented Becker Model
Empirical scrutiny o f both Becker’s economic model o f crime and the Theory o f 
Reasoned Action reveals that both do well explaining criminal behavior. Thus, one 
might hypothesize that the economic variables o f probability o f  getting caught and 
penalty along with the social psychology variables o f  subjective norms and attitudes are 
important to explain criminal behavior.
This thesis synthesizes the contributions o f these models within the framework o f 
the economic model o f crime. The choice to augment the economic model with variables 
from the Theory o f Reasoned Action rather than the reverse stems from the quantifiable 
advantages o f  the economic model allowing for policy that minimizes the social cost o f 
crime. One advantage o f  the economic model is its inclusion o f  theory specifically 
designed to deal with criminal behavior allowing for a direct indication o f policy 
prescriptions.
Recall from the previous chapter that the individual’s decision to engage in crime 
accounts for a small but important segment o f the Becker model. The primary focus o f 
the model is minimizing the social cost o f  crime. On the other hand, the Theory o f 
Reasoned Action’s primary focus is predicting all types o f behavior. If  one is interested 
in predicting or explaining a broad range o f  behaviors, the Theory o f Reasoned Action 
works well; however, because the economic model is geared specifically toward crime, it 
is likely to be more useful in the context o f  this thesis.
Another important reason for the choice o f the economic framework is the fact
that the model allows policymakers to manipulate the causal variables o f crime to reach a
socially optimal point; the social psychology model does not. Predicting crime more
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accurately by including the economic variables within the framework o f  the Theory o f 
Reasoned Action might be possible; unfortunately no policy prescriptions are apparent 
with this approach. In contrast, augmenting the economic model allows policymakers to 
influence the crime rate with a target o f social optimality. The more variables which may 
be rigorously identified as crime rate causes, the more efficiently resources (e.g. 
expenditures on police, advertising campaigns, and increased punishments) can be 
redirected to minimize the social cost o f crime. Thus, the subsequent analysis will focus 
on augmenting the Becker model with variables from the Theory o f  Reasoned Action.
The augmented Becker model is based upon a utility maximization framework. 
Recall that the Becker model posits that punishment and risk o f getting caught influence 
the decision to steal by  changing the return to the criminal act, or expected utility. The 
variables o f  the Theory o f  Reasoned Action could also affect expected utility. Consider 
subjective norms. These variables represent the influence others have on an individual’s 
decision. For instance one would probably be less likely to steal if  the opinion o f others 
important to her was unfavorable toward thieves. Essentially, people want to please 
others whom they respect; therefore engaging in an act deemed bad or inappropriate by 
others reduces the expected utility o f  crime. In the same sense, a person thinking theft is 
bad might feel guilty for stealing. This feeling o f  guilt would also lower the expected 
utility o f  crime. In a sense these factors represent punishment imposed by the individuals 
on themselves. This example demonstrates the rationale for augmenting the Becker 
model with the variables o f attitude and subjective norms.
The augmented Becker model presented here could allow policymakers to 
influence the crime rate not only by changing the probability o f getting caught and
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punishment but also by changing attitudes and subjective norms. A discussion o f  the 
implications o f the addition o f these variables is reserved for the conclusion o f  the thesis.
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Chapter 4 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Chapter 3 summarized the Becker model and the Theory o f  Reasoned Action and 
built an augmented model o f  criminal behavior. The purpose o f that discussion was to set 
the stage for the testing o f a crime-specific version o f such a model. This chapter details 
the necessary variables to test these models and the procedures employed to measure 
each variable; however, before this discussion begins it is important to discuss some 
characteristics o f  the crime being studied. The following paragraphs explain the choice 
to examine criminal behavior through music acquisition.
The challenge to the researcher is to find a criminal behavior that people feel 
comfortable discussing. Recorded music provides such an opportunity because o f the 
widespread acceptability o f illegal acquisition. In a survey o f 2,306 adults, Harris (2003) 
found three in four people agree with the statement: “downloading and then selling
music is piracy and should be prohibited, but downloading for personal use is an innocent 
act and should not be prohibited.” Thus, surveys o f  music acquisition might provide 
insightful information regarding criminal behavior.
4.1 Variables Needed to Test the Models
This thesis tests three models, they are: (1) the individual decision portion o f the 
economic model presented by Becker; (2) the Theory o f  Reasoned Action proposed by 
Fishbien; and (3) an augmented Becker model based upon the economic model with
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elements from the Theory o f Reasoned Action. This section explains what variables are 
needed to test the three approaches. The variables needed for the economic approach are 
discussed first, and the others follow.
Recall that the economic model o f  crime theorizes that the chance o f getting 
caught and the penalty affect the expected utility of, or return to criminal acts.
Traditional tests o f  this model have used variables such as crime rate, number o f  arrests 
per reported crime, number o f  police, sentencing guidelines and average punishment per 
crime. While each o f  these variables comes from an aggregate data source, that is not the 
only way to test this model. Individual survey data may be used to determine the causes 
o f criminal behavior. For example, individual data could be used for the aggregate 
variable, arrests per crime, by asking survey respondents what they believe to be their 
perceived chance o f  getting caught.
The survey technique allows for the testing economic models o f  crime in a unique 
way. Instead o f  a community’s crime rate, individuals’ reporting o f committing or not 
committing a crime is used as a dependant variable. Questions regarding the perceived 
risk o f  getting caught and perceived severity o f  punishment along with socio-economic 
variables allow for the testing o f  the economic model o f crime based upon individual 
level data.
W hile it is possible to test the economic model o f  crime using aggregate or 
individual level data, testing the Theory o f  Reasoned Action requires individual level 
data. This is due to the fact that the model is based upon individual attitudes and norms; 
one can see the difficulty o f  collecting an aggregate measure o f  individual ethical and 
normative beliefs. Because the Theory o f  Reasoned Action requires individual level data
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survey questions were developed based upon the literature. Likert scale responses to 
statements regarding attitudes toward theft, subjective norms, and ethical beliefs 
constitute the variables needed to test this model.
Combining the variables o f the Theory o f  Reasoned Action with The Becker 
model allows for the testing o f  the augmented Becker model o f crime. The augmented 
model hypothesizes that norms, and attitudes, together with the chance o f getting caught, 
the severity o f  punishment, and socio-economic characteristics provide a better 
explanation o f  criminal behavior than does either model alone. The augmented model 
requires no further introduction o f variables. It simply uses variables from both the 
Becker model o f crime and the Theory o f  Reasoned Action.
4.2 Developing the Questionnaire and Collecting the Data
Guided by the literature, extended discussions by the Economics Research 
Seminar at the University o f  Montana formulated a set o f  questions that would provide 
data for testing the three previously described methods o f explaining crime.
To gather data on these variables along with the variables from the Becker model, 
the Theory o f Reasoned Action and the augmented Becker model a survey was developed 
containing 40 questions. A pilot run was used to determine if  there were any problems 
with the implementation o f the survey. The pilot run indicated minor changes, including 
removing respondents’ names and addresses from the questionnaire. Appendix A 
provides a eopy o f the interview form.
Between February 2004 and October 2005 twenty-five interviewers from the 
Economics Research Seminar administered five hundred questionnaires within the eity o f
M issoula Montana. Before the surveys were conducted interviewers were required to
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take and pass and Institutional Review Board ethics course, and the interviewers received 
instruction through coursework as well as individually regarding proper interviewing 
techniques and responsibilities.
The administration o f  the interviews followed strict sampling procedures. Based 
upon data and a map from the M issoula Office o f Planning and Grants, interviewers were 
sent to seventeen neighborhoods constituting the entire population o f  the city. Based 
upon neighborhood population relative to the city population, a set number o f surveys per 
neighborhood were collected.
Throwing a dart or dropping a pen on each neighborhood map achieved 
randomness. The interviewer went to the randomly selected location and headed in 
predetermined direction -  north from the first point, south from the second, etc. - until 
contacting a willing interviewee aged 18 or older. The interviewer then explained the 
interview form to the interviewee who then wrote his or her responses to each question 
on the form and handed it to the interviewer in a sealed envelope.
To ensure that the sample accurately represented the population, socio-economic 
data was collected from the respondents and compared to the population. Table 4.1 
shows this comparison.
Table 4.1 
Comparison of the Sample Means 
to the Population Means
Population Sample
Age 30.3 31.51
Males 49% 56%
Household 2.23 2.77
Renters 49% 58%
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Variation between the population and the sample may reflect the fact that the sample used 
in this analysis is not a sample o f  the total population; rather it is a sample o f individuals 
that have acquired music in the last six months.
4.3 Reasons for the Use of a Survey
Because the study uses a survey rather than aggregate data there are implications 
regarding the results that differ from results produced by aggregated data. In the 
aggregate case, many studies o f  crime used the crime rate as a dependant variable. A 
researcher employing this technique might be able to conclude that a rise in punishment 
or probability o f getting caught decreases the crime rate. However, the links to the 
individual reasons for committing a crime are not known. On the other hand, a survey 
allows for a determination o f  the relationship that exists between crime and the 
characteristics o f the individuals committing it. This suggests individual behaviors that 
might be influenced to reduce crime through changes in police forces, penalties, and the 
use o f  marketing techniques aimed at influencing attitudes and norms.
From a policy standpoint, the aggregate investigation allows for policies that 
change the crime rate while the survey approach allows for policies that reduce the 
probability that an individual will steal. This difference is minimal until one examines 
the variables that are used in each approach. An aggregate investigation into crime 
results in a limited number o f  variables that can be manipulated by policy makers. 
Because aggregate data can be collected only for chance o f getting caught and penalty -  
e.g. arrest rate and punishment - these variables are the only tools policymakers have to 
manipulate the crime rate. On the other hand, individual level data can explain individual
reasons people steal. This data can be collected on a wide range o f causal variable e.g.
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attitudes, norms, and abilities. These numbers furnish policy makers with a much wider 
range o f  variables that might be manipulated to reduce the social cost o f  crime.
Another benefit o f  this type o f  research is that the survey is specific to this study. 
Other empirical works have used pre-collected data sources that lack one or more 
important variable. M any studies o f  this type are forced to use proxies for variables that 
are unavailable. Thus using individual surveys is a good way to eliminate the omitted 
variable problem.
In summary, a better understanding o f individual reasons why people steal leads 
to an increase in the options policy makers have to manipulate the crime rate. Avoiding 
the omitted variable problem provides better testing o f the economic model o f crime. 
Taken together these two examples provide powerful reasons for using a questionnaire to 
study crime.
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Chapter 5 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The previous chapters laid the groundwork for the analysis o f  three models 
explaining criminal behavior that takes place in this chapter. The three models are 
Becker’s economic model, the Theory o f Reasoned Action, and the augmented Becker 
model. Analysis o f  each model is discussed, in turn, following an explanation o f  the 
binary logistic approach to their testing.
5.1 The Logit
Engaging in theft is a choice between stealing and not stealing. This is known as a 
dichotomous choice and can be measured as whether a person (a) engages in crime or (b) 
does not. One o f the properties o f dichotomous choice is the ability to express the 
dependent variable as the odds o f an event occurring. W ithin this framework, the values 
o f the independent variables’ effect on (a) and (b) can be estimated using the logit model. 
The logit with its cumulative logistic distribution is not the only model o f dichotomous 
choice; models such as the probit based upon the cumulative normal distribution are also 
available. The logit enjoys widespread use due to mathematical properties o f the 
cumulative logistic distribution that allow for relatively simple analysis. The choice to 
use the logit model over other models o f  binary choice seems reasonable based upon the 
fact that the decision o f which binary choice model produces the best estimations remains 
unresolved and in m any cases makes little difference (Greene, 1990).
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Because the logit model provides a sound method to explore dichotomous choice, 
it will be used to explain the relationship among the dependent variable and the 
independent variables o f each model. The probability o f  whether an individual bought or 
stole her last acquisition o f music is the dependent variable for all four models. This 
behavior (Theft) is dichotomous, therefore:
Theft = 1 when the individual stole on her last acquisition
Theft = 0 when the individual bought on her last acquisition
5.2 Becker Model Results
Five hundred respondents reported acquiring music. The choices o f  these 500 
individuals are used in all three models. Here they are evaluated based upon the 
following Becker model adapted from the economic literature:
p(Theft) = f[Caught, Penalty, Age, Gender, Edu, Lowinc, Medinc, House, 
Rent]’
Where,
p(Theft)= the probability that a person steals
Caught = a respondent’s belief o f  her chances o f getting caught if  she 
attempted to act illegally (0-10, 10 being “great risk”)
Penalty= a respondent’s belief regarding how severe her penalty would be 
i f  she got caught (0-10, 10 being “great risk)
Age = age o f  respondent
’ Appendix B presents the source o f  each variable in this and other sections o f  the analysis chapter.
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Gender = gender, where male is 1 female is 0 
Edu = years o f  formal education (e.g. 1 year college = 13 years) 
Lowinc^ if  respondent’s household income is less than $25,000, 
Low inc=l, otherwise Lowinc=0 
Medinc= if  respondent’s household income is between $25,001 and 
$50,000, M edinc=l, otherwise Medinc=0 
House = the number of members in the respondent’s household. 
Rent = 1 i f  the respondent is renting, 0 otherwise
The summary statistics for the variables o f  interest are as follow;
Table 5.1
Descriptive Statistics of Becker Variables
Minimum Maximum Mean
Standard
Deviation
Caught 0.00 10.00 2.42 2.41
Penalty 0.00 10.00 3.41 2.91
Age 18.00 85.00 31.78 14.25
Gender 0.00 1.00 0.55 0.50
Edu 3.00 25.00 14.91 2.30
Lowinc 0.00 1.00 0.44 0.50
Medinc 0.00 1.00 0.38 0.49
House 0.00 30.00 2.73 1.95
Rent 0.00 1.00 0.60 0.49
The minimum and maximum on caught and penalty are due to their Likert scale 
measurement from 0 to 10. In the case o f caught, 10 represents a “great chance” of 
getting caught; in the case o f penalty, 10 represents “great severity.”
Table 5.2 shows the logit estimation o f the data for the Becker model.
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Table 5.2 
Becker Model Logistical Results
P S.E. t-ratio
Caught -0.20 0.06 -3.49*
Penalty 0.00 0.04 0.04
Age -0.08 -0.20 -4.98*
Gender -0.16 0.22 -0.72
Edu 0.01 0.05 0.09
Lowinc -0.51 0.39 -1.32
Medinc -0.55 0.37 -1.48
House -0.12 0.08 -1.42
Rent 0.28 0.30 0.92
Constant 2.40 1.07 2.25*
""Significant at a=.05, two sided 
Before the interpretation o f the model it is important to test for goodness o f fit, to 
perform hypothesis test on the variables, and to test for significant coefficients. The 
Hosmer-Lemeshow tests whether the data fits the logistic curve. The test generates a p- 
value; a good fit is a p-value greater than .05, and in general the larger the p-value the 
better the goodness o f  fit. The Hosmer-Lemeshow p-value for this data is .357; thus the 
logit model fits the data.
A common test to determine if  all o f  the slope coefficients are zero is the 
likelihood ratio test. The test is similar to the F test in an ordinary least squares 
regression. The likelihood ratio statistic is distributed chi-squared, and for this data set 
the calculated value is 87.89 with 9 degrees o f freedom. The corresponding p-value is 
zero, so the joint hypothesis that the coefficients are all equal to zero is rejected.
One commonly used method o f  determining the significance o f the variables in 
maximum likelihood is the asymptotic f-test. The r-test is performed using the standard
errors from the information matrix and critical points from the standard normal table.
40
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The f-tests o f  the coefficient for Caught, Age and the constant are significant at the five 
percent error level.
Because o f  the properties o f the logit model, magnitudes o f  the coefficients are 
not easily interpretable; however, the signs o f the coefficients are useful in revealing the 
direction o f  the effects. For example, because the coefficients o f  Caught and Age are 
negative, as their values increase the probability o f  theft decreases. For the categorical 
variables one could tell which trait is more likely to result in theft. For example, if  
gender proved to be statistically significant and the sign on the coefficient was negative, 
males would be more likely to steal.*
Due to the difficulty o f  interpreting the meaning o f the coefficients directly, other 
indirect methods o f  interpreting the logistical results are employed. Two o f the most 
popular methods are examining the marginal effects and the elasticities o f  particular 
independent variables. Table 5.3 shows marginal effects calculated at the means, the 
means o f the individual marginal effects, and the elasticity at the means.
Table 5.3
Magnitude of the Effects of Becker Model 
Significant Independent Variables
Calc at 
the 
Means
M ean o f 
Individual 
Effects
Elasticity 
at Means
Caught
Age
-0.035
-0.014
-0-033
-0.014
-0.373
-1.990
An ordinary least squares regression produces a straight line; a binary logistical 
regression does not. Therefore, the slope is constantly changing. The slope could be 
increasing at an increasing or decreasing rate depending on what point is chosen along
® The gender example is used for illustrative purposes; it is not statistically significant.
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the function. The marginal value calculated at the m ean is the slope o f the logit function 
at the m ean o f  the variable in question holding all other variables constant at their means. 
For Caught, evaluated at its mean, a one-unit increase in the Likert Scale value (i.e., a 
person moves one unit - out o f  10 - closer to believing she has a “great chance o f getting 
caught”) translates into a decrease in the probability o f  theft o f 3.5 percentage points. 
The average marginal effect, or the average slope as one goes from the lowest value to 
the highest value o f  an independent variable, is largest for Caught. This suggests that 
every unit increase for a person at the minimum who thinks there is a “great chance of 
getting caught” results in a 3.3 percentage point reduction in probability o f theft. This is 
an average result that continues until the person reaches the maximum point where the 
individual thinks there in no risk o f  getting caught. The elasticity is a ratio o f percentage 
changes. Thus, for Caught (at its mean) a ten percent increase would lead to a 3.7 percent 
decrease in the probability o f  theft. These statistics help to explain the magnitudes o f the 
independent variables.
The previous values are exact measurements o f  the magnitudes o f  effects. The 
elasticity and the marginal effects calculated at the mean do not represent the entire range 
o f responses but one point along the function. On the other hand, the mean o f the 
marginal effects represents the entire range of responses. Although this statistic can be 
useful, it is very sensitive to extreme points on the function. Therefore because the first 
two statistics only explain one point along the function and the last statistic is sensitive to 
outliers, it is useful to look at the logistical function in graphical form. A graph o f this 
type shows the relationships along the entire function.
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Figure 5.1 
Becker Model:
Effect of Getting Caught on the Probability of Theft, 
Holding Ail Else Constant at the Mean
%
0
1
0.3
0 25
0.2
0,15
0.1
0.05
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 87 9 10
Individual's Estimate of the Chance of Getting Caught
how the individual’s perception o f the probability o f getting 
theft. The probability o f  theft for a person
Figure 5.1 shows 
caught effects the probability she engages 
believing she has a limited chance o f  getting caught (a value o f  one on the Likert scale) is 
approximately 27 percent. On the other extreme, a person believing she has a “great 
chance o f getting caught” (a value o f  ten on the Likert scale) would likely steal 
approximately 7.5 percent o f  the time. The fact that Caught is statistically significant 
allows us to conclude that people who believe that they have a high chance o f getting 
caught will have a lower probability o f  committing theft, all else constant.
Age is the other independent variable that is significant. The average person 
responding to the survey was approximately 32 years old. According to the regression 
when a person representing the average case turns 33 her expected probability o f stealing 
would go down by  1.4 percentage points. In fact the data explains that on average 1.3
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percentage point change in probability o f  theft could be expected across the spectrum o f 
ages. Figure 5.2 shows the effect o f  age on the probability o f  stealing over the range o f 
ages. Because age is significant, the conclusion can be drawn that an older person is less 
likely to steal than a younger person.
Figure 5.2 
Becker Model:
Effect of Age on the Probability of Theft, 
All Else Constant at the Means
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Table 5.4 presents results measuring the predictive capability o f  this logit model.
It looks at the predicted values o f  p(Theft) and compares them with the actual values.
The model predicts buying correctly 92.7 percent o f  the time. The model predicts theft 
with only 25.5 percent success. Together the model correctly predicts legal and illegal 
behavior 73.2 percent o f the time. Seventy one percent o f the sample legally acquired 
their last music. In this case, since a person guessing “legal” every time would be correct 
71 percent o f  the time, the 71 percent guess works nearly as well as the model.
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Table 5.4
Successful Prediction by the Becker Model
Observed
Predicted Predicted
Buy Theft
Correct
Actual Buy 329 26 92.7%
Actual Theft 329 37 25.5%
Overall 73.2%
Table 5.4 does not represent the goodness o f  fit o f  the model. The temptation to 
use the table for goodness o f  fit should be resisted according to Kennedy (2003). In 
addition, there is disagreement among scholars concerning the usefulness o f  the 
predictive ability o f the logit model. The rational for such disagreement can be strong in 
cases were odds o f  a particular outcome are relatively high. Failure to steal music by 
respondents in this study is a case in point. Predicting the lack o f stealing adds little to 
the understanding o f  criminal behavior. Since the goal o f  this study is to explain criminal 
behavior and furnish guidelines for its potential modification, prediction is not 
particularly relevant.
5.3 Theory of Reasoned Action Results
Separate analysis o f  the logit regression for the same sample o f 500 individuals 
allowed for a test o f  the Theory o f  Reasoned Action. Testing o f the model followed the 
equation:
p(theft) = f(attitude, norms)
W here,
p(theft) = the probability that a person steals
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Norms = subjective norms, a respondent’s belief o f  what people 
important to them think about music theft 
Attitude = the sum o f  the respondent’s attitudes toward performing music 
theft
Table 5.5 shows the statistics for the variables o f  interest.
Table 5.5
Descriptive Statistics of Theory of Reasoned Action
Minimum Maximum
1
Mean
Std.
Deviation
Attitude -20.00 20.00 1.02 6.50
Norms -10.00 10.00 .12 i 5.91
The minimum and maximum values o f  -1 0  to 10 o f  norms reflect the minimum and 
maximum o f their Likert scale measurement. The minimum and maximum o f attitude are 
due to the aggregation o f  five attitude questions based upon the literature. This formula 
contains two questions about the industry (e.g., how fair is the amount artists earn, and 
how do you feel about the music industry) are averaged together and summed with three 
questions about personal beliefs (e.g. how ethical is theft, does it harm anyone, and 
should people who engage in it be punished). The range o f the attitude scale, from +20 to 
-20 , was arbitrary set to remind the reader that it includes five Likert scale values. These 
values represent attitude toward the act as well as ethical considerations as defined by the 
literature.
The following paragraphs discuss hypothesis tests. To evaluate the model three 
hypothesis tests are considered. The first test is the Hosmer-Lemeshow test to determine 
if  the logit framework is appropriate for the data. It generates a p-value o f  .41, and
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because .41 is greater than .05 this hypothesis test confirms that the model is appropriate 
for the data set. The second hypothesis test, used to evaluate whether or not the 
coefficients are zero, is the likelihood ratio test. The likelihood ratio statistic is 
distributed chi-squared. The test value for this model is 52.9 with 2 degrees o f freedom. 
This value is greater than the critical value o f  5.99 at the five percent error level. Thus, 
the joint hypothesis that all coefficients equal zero is rejected.
The next step in the analysis is to determine the significance o f the variables in 
question with the classic f-test. A  calculated value is compared to a critical value. In this 
model all coefficients are significant at the five percent error level. Table 5.6 presents 
these results.
Table 5,6
Theory of Reasoned Action Logistical Results
B S.E. f-ratio
Attitude
Norms
Constant
-.69
-.078
.926
.018
.020
107
-3.84*
-3.78*
-8.67*
* Significant at a=.05, two tailed 
The signs o f  the coefficients in a logit regression are particularly important. In
this case both coefficients are negative. This means as the values o f  Attitude and Norms
increase the probability o f  theft decreases. This is in line with the hypothesis o f the
theory chapter.
W hile the coefficients convey information regarding the direction o f the effects, 
they reveal little about the magnitude o f  the effects. As discussed in the previous section, 
understanding the magnitude o f  the effects requires the calculation o f the marginal
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effects, the mean o f  the marginal effects and the elasticities. Table 5.7 presents these 
results.
Table 5.7
Magnitude of the Effects Theory of Reasoned 
Action Significant Independent Variables
Calc at 
the 
Means
Mean o f 
Individual 
Effects
Elasticity 
at Means
Attitude
Norms
-0.013
-0.015
-0.013
-0.014
-0.050
-0.007
For Attitude evaluated at its mean, a one-unit increase in the index value (i.e., a person 
moves one unit closer to believing theft is ethical, no one gets harmed, etc.) translates 
into an increase in the probability a person will steal by 1.3 percentage points. The 
average marginal effect o f norms between the values o f  -10 to 10 is -1 .4  percentage 
points. The elasticity at the means is a ratio o f  the percentage changes; thus for Attitude a 
ten percent increase implies a .5 percent decrease in the probability o f  the theft, all else 
constant calculated at the means. Figure 5.3 helps to illustrate these effects.
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Figure 5.3 
Theory of Reasoned Action:
Effect on Attitude, All Else Constant at the Means
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A person with an attitude presumed to be completely accepting o f  stealing is represented 
by the value —20. According to the regression, an individual with this attitude bas 
approximately a 60 percent probability o f  stealing. As attitude changes toward 
disapproval o f  theft, the probability o f theft decreases to below 10 percent.
Changes in normative beliefs also change the probability that theft will occur. 
Figure 5.4 illustrates how different values o f normative beliefs affect the summed value 
o f attitudes.
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Figure 5.4 
Theory of Reasoned Action:
Change In Attitude while Holding Norms Constant 
at -10, -5, 0, 5, and 10
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The graph shows how Norms affect the relationship between Attitudes and theft. Norms 
are held constant at five levels as Attitude varies. The values o f -2 0  for Attitude and -1 0  
for norms represent an individual presumed to be the most likely thief. The regression 
shows that a person representing these values would likely steal around 78 percent o f the 
time. This is the highest percentage o f  theft explained by the regression. This is 
represented on graph by the line with diamonds at the point where Attitude equals -20 . 
Now, consider a person with the same Attitude value, -20, but with a Norm value 
representing no permissiveness to stealing (norm=10). This person has a far lower 
probability o f theft than a person whose friends think it is ok; they would likely steal 42 
percent o f the time. As shown in Figure 5.4 Norms has the greatest impact on the
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probability o f  theft when people have attitudes permissive to theft. It can be seen that 
there is a wider range o f probabilities for a person with a permissive attitude as Norms 
change than at the other extreme. As Norms change fi-om -1 0  to +10, a person with 
permissive attitudes probability o f theft varies approximately 35 percentage points, while 
a person with a non-permissive attitudes probability o f  theft varies by 10 percentage 
points. As attitude becomes more permissive toward theft the change in normative 
beliefs has less o f an impact on the probability o f theft. The variables o f the theory tested 
here are significant and helpful in explaining theft behavior.
Table 5.8
Successful Prediction by the Theory of Reasoned Action
Observed
Predicted Predicted
Buy Theft
Correct
Actual Buy 328 27 92.4%
Actual Theft 115 30 20.7%
Overall 71.6%
Table 5.8 presents results measuring the predictive capability o f this logit model. 
It looks at the predicted values o f p(theft) and compares them with the actual values. The 
model predicts buying correctly 92 percent o f  the time. The model predicts theft with 
only 20 percent success. Together the model correctly predicts legal and illegal behavior 
72 percent o f  the time. The naive model, which considers all people to be buyers, 
predicts correctly 71 percent o f  the time. The predictive power o f this model is minimal, 
however as noted earlier this may have little bearing on the conclusions o f the study.
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5.4 Augmented Becker Model Results
As discussed in the theory section, the augmented model explains how variables 
in both the Theory o f  Reasoned Action and the Becker model m ay affect crime through 
changes in expected utility. It takes the functional form:
p(Theft) = ft Attitude, Norms, Caught, Penalty, Age, Gender, Edu, Lowinc, 
Medinc, House, Rent]
Because the variables are the same as in the two previous analyses, the summary statistics 
are not presented.
The same hypothesis tests discussed in the previous sections were used to 
determine the validity o f  the model. The Hosmer-Lemeshow test generated a p-value o f 
.099 suggesting that the model fits. The likelihood ratio test generated the test statistic o f 
111. W ith eleven degrees o f freedom the critical value is approximately 20; thus the 
slope coefficients are not zero.
The likelihood ratio test was also conducted to determine if  additional variables 
were useful in explaining the data. Two hypothesis tests were performed; one testing the 
augmented model with variables from the Theory o f Reasoned Action (restricting the 
Becker variables), and one testing the model with just the Becker variables (restricting 
the Theory o f  Reasoned Action variables). These tests resulted in a p-value o f zero, 
confirming that the augmented Becker model is more useful in explaining the probability 
o f  theft than either o f  the other models alone.
Table 5.9 presents the results for the logit regression on this model. Significance
is determined by the asymptotic t- test and is denoted by a star.
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Table 5.9
Augmented Becker Model Logit Results
P S.E. t-ratio
Caught -0.19 0.06 -3.23*
Penalty 0.05 0.04 1.05
Attitude -0.06 0.02 -3.10*
Norms -0.05 0.02 -2.27*
Age -0.07 0.02 -4.35*
Gender -0.28 0.23 -1.71
Edu 0.02 0.06 0.27
Lowinc -0.69 0.40 -1.71
Medinc -0.70 0.38 -1.83
House -0.10 0.09 -1.22
Rent 0.28 0.31 0.91
Constant 1.91 1.10 1.74
’•‘significant at a=.05, two sided 
The coefficients on Caught, Attitude, Norms, and Age are all significant. Because each 
o f these coefficients is negative, an increase in their value represents a decrease in the 
probability o f  theft. Determining the magnitude o f these effects requires the calculation 
o f the three other statistics presented in Table 5.10.
Table 5.10
Magnitude of Effects of Augmented Becker
Calc at 
the 
Means
M ean o f 
Individual 
Effects
Elasticity 
at Means
Caught
Attitude
Norms
Age
-0.032
-0.011
-0.008
-0.012
-0.010
-0.008
0.031
0.011
-0.354
-0.050
-0.005
-1.728
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The interpretation o f  Table 5.10 is similar to the previous analysis. For example, 
with Attitude evaluated at its mean, a one-unit increase in the index value (i.e., a person 
moves one unit closer to believing theft is ethical, no one gets harmed, etc.) translates 
into an decrease in the probability a person will steal by 1.1 percentage points. The 
average marginal effect o f attitude as it varies fi'om -20 to 20 is -.8 percentage points. 
The elasticity at the means is a ratio o f the percentage changes. Thus, for Attitude a 10 
percent increase implies a .5 percent decrease in the probability o f  the theft, all else 
constant calculated at the means. The following figures (Figures 5.4, 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7) 
help to illustrate these effects.
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Figure 5.5
Augmented Model: Effect of Caught on the Probability of Theft, 
All Else Constant at the Means
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Figure 5.6
Augmented Model: Effect of Attitude on the Probability of Theft,
Ait Else Constant at the Means
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Figure 5.7
Augmented Model: Effect of Normativie Beliefs on the Probability 
of Theft, All Else Constant at the Means
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Figure 5.8
Augmented Model: Effect of Age on the Proababiiity of Theft,
All Else Constant at the Means
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W ithin the framework o f  the augmented model, each graphed variable affects the 
probability o f  theft holding all other variables constant at their means. The next figures 
are similar to Figure 5.8. However, instead o f holding all variables constant, one other 
variable (Caught for Figure 5.9, Attitude for Figure 5.10 and Norms for Figure 5.11) is 
fixed at different levels. The following graphs show how age interacts with the three 
remaining significant variables.
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Figure 5.9
Augmented Model: Effect of Age at Five Levels of Caught, All Else
Constant at the Means
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Figure 5.10
Augmented Model: Effect of Age at Five Levels of Attitude, All Else Constant
at the Means
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Figure 5.11
Augmented Model: Effect of Age at Five Levels of Norms, All Else
Constant at the Means
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The interpretation o f  figures Figure 5.9, 5.10, and 5.11 are very similar to the 
interpretation o f  Figure 5.4 in the previous section.
The variables o f  Caught, Attitudes, Norms, and Age are significant in explaining 
theft within the augmented model. The augmented model also performs better than the 
Becker, or Theory o f  Reasoned Action models at predicting the behavior, as 
demonstrated in Table 5.11.
Table 5.11
Successful Prediction by the Augmented Becker Model
Observed
Predicted Predicted
Buy Theft
Correct
Actual Buy 323 32 91.0%
Actual Theft 92 53 36.6%
Overall 75.2%
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These results suggest that the Augmented Model is capable o f  predicting theft behavior 
correctly 75.2 percent o f  the time. This is 5.1, 2, and 3.6 percentage points better than the 
naive model (picking the most likely response each time), the Becker Model, and the 
Theory o f  Reasoned Action respectively.
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Chapter 6 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The goal o f this thesis was to examine empirically the highly complex nature o f 
criminal behavior using theories tailored to identifying criminal antecedents. This 
approach allowed for the quantifiable evaluation o f differing policy prescriptions 
designed to eliminate or reduce crime. Fundamental characteristics o f the data choice, 
collection methods, theory, and analysis contributed to accomplishing the analysis 
presented in this thesis. Exploiting these characteristics facilitated the testing o f the 
economic model o f crime, the social psychological model and the development and 
testing o f  a theory encompassing both the economic and social psychological 
perspectives termed the augmented Becker model.
6.1 The Use of Individual Level Data
Individual level data has not typically been used in criminal studies due to the 
difficulty o f collecting individual data and the belief that people do not wish to discuss 
their criminal activities. The reliance on aggregated data presents problems for, and 
limits the ability of, the researcher examining criminal behavior economically. Survey 
data is not without its problems and requires changing the way variables have been 
measured. Nevertheless, the advantages o f  using individual data outweigh the difficulty 
o f its collection. Thus, this thesis uses a unique crime (music theft) and survey data to test 
three models o f  criminal behavior.
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One benefit o f  individual level data is the avoidance o f  statistical problems. 
Empirical studies employing aggregate level data in their analysis have generated some 
impressive results (see Chapter 2); however, the use o f  aggregate data can be 
troublesome. Endogeneity stemming from the likely dependency o f  the probability o f  
arrest or the size o f  the police force on the crime rate is difficult to handle 
econometricaliy. This simultaneity problem causes inconsistency in ordinary least 
squares estimators. Two-stage and three-stage least squares have been used by Ehrlich 
(1973), Phillips and Votey (1976), and Craig (1987) in an attempt to eliminate this 
problem. Although, it is probable that the results o f these studies were corrupted by 
unobserved heterogeneity (Cornwell, Trumbull, 1994).
In addition to avoiding the econometric problems associated with aggregate data, 
there are three major advantages to the use o f individual data. First, the theory o f  crime 
explains individual behavior, thus the need for individual data. Underlying the model is 
the idea that one can manipulate the crime rate by changing variables that affect 
individuals’ expected utility return from the criminal behavior. Because o f this, the 
economic m odel o f crime should be estimated with individual level data.
The second advantage o f  the individual level data approach is that survey data 
allows for the testing o f additional variables. In this thesis it is theorized that the chance 
o f  getting caught and punishment are not the only variables that affect expected utility; 
individuals’ attitudes and their perceptions o f what people important to them think 
(subjective norms) are also theorized to have an influence on individuals’ expected utility
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return.^ Collecting data on these variables requires a survey. The new variables make it 
possible to expand upon the conclusions o f the traditional economic approach; however, 
because o f the reliance on aggregate data, the crime literature reports no attempt to 
integrate these variables into the framework o f  the economic model o f crime and 
empirically test it.
The final advantage o f  individual level data involves precise definition o f all 
variables in the study. Collecting survey data allows for the direct selection o f 
information to be gathered. This is an improvement to relying on data collected by others 
because it measures the exact variables suggested by the theory and makes it easier to 
identify the data’s strengths and weaknesses.
W hile avoiding some problems associated with aggregate data, individual level 
data is not above reproach. The fact that surveys can be subpoenaed and the information 
can be used to convict the respondent is a major concern. Because o f the sensitivity o f 
the information, it is important to keep information anonymous and choose a crime that 
people feel comfortable discussing; music theft was identified as just such a crime.
The use of music theft as the dependent variable -  as opposed to the crime rate - 
is one example o f a change in the way individual variables are measured. Traditional 
aggregate economic variables such as the number o f arrests per crime reported, and the 
penalty for each crime must also be altered. These variables were replaced with the 
individuals’ reporting o f  their belief regarding the chance o f getting caught and their 
belief regarding the likely penalty.
 ̂This idea comes from the attempts that have been made to manipulate attitudes and subjective norms to 
reduce the crime rate. The 'friends don’t let friends drink and drive” campaign is an appeal to subjective 
norms, while Mother’s Against Drunk Driving uses video o f children killed by drunk drivers to influence 
attitudes.
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The use o f music theft as the basis for the collection o f  individual data makes it 
possible to exploit the advantages o f this approach and avoid the problems inherent in the 
aggregate approach. Individual data allows econometric problems to be avoided, 
improved testing o f  individual behavior, new conclusions to be drawn, and more accurate 
definition o f  the variables. Because o f  these benefits, survey data provides the 
foundation for the empirical analysis o f  this thesis.
6.2 Comparison of the Three Models
The three models presented in the analysis chapter are the Becker model, the 
Theory o f  Reasoned Action, and the augmented Becker Model. The Becker model is 
essentially aimed at exploring the relationship that Caught and Penalty have with theft. 
The Theory o f  Reasoned Action is a more general behavioral model. It is concerned with 
how the variables o f attitudes and subjective norms affect behavior. The augmented 
Becker model is an attempt to combine elements from each o f the proceeding models in 
an effort to provide a better understanding o f  criminal behavior.
All three o f these models were tested using the technique o f binary logistical 
regression. Binary logistical regression does not have a meaningful equivalent to the 
correlation coefficient o f least squares regression. Because o f  this fact, there are no easy 
comparisons between the models. However, several scholars have devised formulas that 
approximate the correlation coefficient. Results o f  these formulas are presented in Table 
6 . 1.
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Table 6.1 
Logistic Approximations for the 
Square of the Correlation Coefficient
Becker TORA Augmented
Estrella 0.17 0.10 0.22
Maddala 0.16 0.10 0.20
Crag-Uhler 0.23 0.14 0.28
McFadden 0.15 0.09 0 1 8
Table 6.1 provides further evidence that the augmented Becker model explains 
criminal behavior better than the Becker or the Theory o f  Reasoned Action alone. This is 
due to the fact that every calculation o f the proxy value is greater in the augmented 
model than in the other two. The Becker model and the Theory o f Reasoned Action 
explain criminal behavior. Integrating the two models, however, within the framework o f 
the economic model, increases the explanatory power o f  the model and provides those 
interested in crime prevention more options to reduce criminal activities.
6.3 Policy Implications
The economic model o f  crime is not geared toward ending crime per se; the goal 
is to minimize the efficiency loss associated with it. Thus, many economic studies have 
been designed to aid policy makers in selecting the optimal level o f expenditures on 
enforcement (to increase the probability o f  getting caught) and penalties. For example, if 
criminal enterprises were costing society $500 a year it would be worth up to $500 to 
stop the activity. The basic economic model would try to stop the crime by dividing up 
the $500 among the most effective crime prevention strategies. More specifically, the 
marginal cost o f  prevention is compared to the marginal benefit o f  the reduction in crime. 
This could be a mix between funding more police and increasing the penalty, or all the
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m oney could go to increasing the penalty.'® This model does not include the social 
psychology variables. The addition o f  attitudes and norms gives policy makers more 
options to achieve an optimal solution to the problem o f  criminal behavior.
Understanding how this model helps in achieving an optimal crime strategy 
requires revisiting the results. In the logistic output o f  the augmented Becker model the 
coefficients for chance o f getting caught, attitude, subjective norms and age were 
significant. Because o f  their significance, it could be concluded that manipulation o f any 
of these variables could affect an individual’s probability o f engaging in music theft." 
Consider the possibility o f changing what an individual representing the average case 
thought to be the probability o f  getting caught by one unit. This change would decrease 
theft by 3.2 percentage points. A  similar change in attitude would decrease theft by 1.1 
percentage points. A one unit increase in norms would decrease theft by .8 percentage 
points. I f  the costs o f  increasing these variables by one unit were known, it would be 
possible to choose the best course o f  action. This would help generate the optimal 
reduction o f theft.
6.4 Industry Application
Implications exist for firms interested in preventing theft. Business and 
institutions suffering losses from theft eould benefit from employing the same teehniques 
described in the previous section. In addition businesses and institutions have other 
options available when attempting to mitigate the negative aspects o f theft. This thesis
Some penalties carry additional cost to society ( i.e., lost wages, lost productivity, etc); however for the 
illustrative case presented here this fact will be ignored.
' ' Age, o f  course, cannot be manipulated.
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has examined music theft; thus the examples used here are directly related to the music 
industry.
Typically, a company wishing to prevent theft has fewer resources available than 
the government to combat theft. For example they cannot arrest and convict people. 
Nevertheless, a company wishing to prevent theft may have means to deter theft 
unavailable to the government. In the case o f  music theft, age is a significant variable. 
The older the respondent, the less likely she is to steal. Based upon this result, the music 
industry m ay wish to introduce a differential pricing model based upon age. Student 
discounts and other offers aimed at young people might help to reduce theft in this 
segment o f the population.
Another factor that the industry can influence is attitudes. Because perception o f 
the music industry and recording artists are a component o f the attitude variable, image is 
also important. Confidentiality clauses about the artists’ compensation and marketing 
promoting qualities o f  the industry are some o f  the strategies that could be employed to 
reduce music theft.
Firms have a clear motivation for understanding theft behavior. According to the 
results, altering acquisition behavior requires changing the chance o f getting caught, 
attitudes, norms, and age. Firms interested in persuading more people to buy their 
products have some ability to manipulate these variables.
6.5 Suggestions for Further Study
The economic model o f crime and the Theory o f Reasoned Action have been the
basis for many studies. W hile each model has been evaluated separately, this thesis may
be the first attempt to integrate these concepts within the firamework o f utility
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maximization. In any case, there is little economic literature that encompasses both o f 
these approaches at once. The implications o f the augmented Becker model, along with 
the significance o f  the results, suggest that further research on this subject could be 
beneficial in gaining a better understanding o f  criminal behavior.
There are four specific suggestions for further study presented here. The first is to 
attempt to verify the conclusions o f this study using other criminal behaviors. People 
might be forthcoming in divulging information about other criminal behaviors such as 
highway speed limits or hunting and fishing regulations. Even more deviant behaviors 
might be explored because, in general, respondents were forthcoming about their 
behavior. When administering the questionnaires the University’s Institutional Review 
Board appeared more concerned with the information than the respondents. If admitting 
to music theft is indicative o f  other studies on crime, survey responses should be 
obtainable.
The second suggestion for further study involves the variable for subjective 
norms. In the literature this is described as what others important to the individual in 
question think o f her behavior. Generally, this variable is disaggregated into questions 
such as, “W hat would your co-workers think about this behavior?” and “What would 
your family think?” For this thesis this was not the case. The variable for subjective 
norms came from the Likert r e s p o n s e to  question 26 on the survey: “The fact that many 
other people download music for free makes it ok for me to do it.” While this question 
offers a decent proxy for the variable subjective norms, it would have been desirable to 
have disaggregated information consistent with the literature.
-10 = Strongly Disagree, 10 = Strongly Agree
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Another area o f  study that could prove worthwhile would be an examination o f 
the relationship o f  actions already undertaken to decrease the crime rate through 
manipulation o f  norms and attitudes. In Montana there are marketing efforts aimed at 
reducing the consumption o f  alcohol among young people, one o f which is entitled the 
“most o f  us” campaign. This effort offers statistics claiming most people do not engage 
in alcohol consumption. It is an appeal to subjective norms. Evaluating campaigns o f 
this sort would be valuable. The ability to alter norms and -  if  norm alteration proved 
successful -  the effect changing norms have on behavior could provide policy guidance.
The final suggestion for further study presented in this thesis concerns evaluation
o f the costs associated with manipulation o f  the variables from the augmented Becker
model. Consider the following scenario:
Increasing the chance o f  getting caught by one Likert scale 
unit decreases the probability o f theft by 5 percentage points.
Changing normative beliefs by increasing one Likert scale 
unit also decreases the probability o f  theft by 5 percentage 
points. It cost $50,000 to hire one more police officer; 
study indicates that the addition o f this officer is expected to 
increase the likelihood someone gets caught by one Likert 
scale unit. A  marketing campaign (e.g. billboards, print ads 
and commercials) is designed to influence normative beliefs.
The campaign costs $200,000 and is expected to increase the 
Likert scale value o f norms by one unit.
In this simple scenario, it is obvious a new police officer should be hired. The 
same five percent reduction in crime can be reached by a quarter o f the expenditure. 
Some complications arise due to the changing slope o f the logistical function. However, 
it is possible to calculate incremental increases or decreases in probability o f theft and 
their corresponding Likert scale values. Because this possibility exists, knowing the cost
Assume these figures are at the mean, all else constant.
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associated with moving a person along the Likert scale could help determine the best 
policy options. Techniques are available to evaluate these costs; their evaluation could 
prove worthwhile in determining the policy mix that best reduces criminal behavior.
6.6 Conclusion
Past economic studies o f crime concentrated on aggregate data. This prevented 
the testing o f  some o f the variables shown in this thesis to explain criminal behavior. 
Analysis o f  data collected from surveys revealed the traditional economic variable o f 
Caught explains music theft. In addition to this result, Attitude and Norms were also 
significant in explaining theft. Integrating these results into the augmented Becker model 
revealed that all three variables explain theft more accurately. This result would not have 
been possible using aggregate data.
It has been shown that evaluating criminal behavior by analyzing individuals’ 
responses introduces Attitudes and Norms into the classic economic model o f crime. 
Personal guilt (Attitudes), peer pressure (Norms), and the chance of getting caught 
(Caught) affect the expected utility o f  a criminal act. In theory, decreasing the expected 
utility gain from engaging in crime lowers the crime rate. Those wishing to decrease the 
crime rate need only reduce the crim e’s expected utility. These two new variables extend 
the options available to parties interested in moderating criminal behavior. The results o f 
this thesis establish an encouraging addition to the economics o f crime. Combined with 
future empirical work, these results have the potential to inspire approaches that are more 
effective in minimizing the losses associated with criminal activity.
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Appendix A 
QUESTIONNAIRE SAMPLE
1) Do you have access to a computer?
 Yes
 No
2) If  yes, is it connected to the Internet?
 Yes
No
3) If  yes, what type o f  Internet connection do you most often use?
 Dial-Up (a slower connection)
 DSL, Cable, Satellite, T1 or greater (a faster connection)
4) W hat ways do you have available to play recorded music? (check all that apply)
 CD player (portable, auto or home)
 Cassette Tape player
 MP3 player (separate from your computer)
 Computer
 Phonograph (record player)
5) Have you acquired audio music in the last 6 months? (Purchased or downloaded for 
free or paid)
 Yes
 No
If  NO go to question number 35.
Consider the last time you acquired music (purchased or downloaded for free or paid).
6 ) ___________How m any songs did you acquire (average CD has about 12-15 songs)?
7) On what form was the music?
 CD
 Data file (MP3, WAV, etc)
 Tape
Record
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8) W here did you get this music (check only one)?
a )_____Bought NEW  at a physical store
b  )_____ Bought NEW  at an Internet store
c )_____ Bought USED at a physical store
d )_____ Bought USED at an Internet store (e.g. half.com, amazon.com, etc.)
e )_____ Internet paid download (e.g. iTunes, M usicmatch, Rhapsody,
BuyMusic.com, etc)
f )_____Mail order (e.g. music club), advertisement (e.g. TV, radio), catalog
g )____ Internet unpaid download (e.g. Kazaa, Morpheus, iMesh, etc.)
h  )____ Y ou copied borrowed music from a friend
i )_____ Friend copied music for you
j)_____ Borrowed and returned
k)____ Borrowed and did not return
I)_____ Promotional free music
Answer questions 9 a and b only if  you paid for the last music (a,b,c,d,e or f).
9a) $__________________ How much money did you spend?
9b) $__________________ Assume the music had a higher price than you paid, how high
would that price have to reach before you acquire the music without paying for it? (Go to
question 11 )
Answer question 10 a and b only i f  you checked g, h, or i in question 8.
10a) $________________ How much would this music have cost you if  you bought? (Give
your best estimate)
10b) $________________ How much less would your estimated price need to have been
for you to have bought this music?
The following questions relate to how much time you spent in the process o f  getting the 
music. Please read all four before answering them.
11 )  MINUTES How m uch time did vou spend deciding which
music you wished to get (research, reading reviews from magazines or the Internet, 
comparing music, listening to samples on the web, etc..) for this last music?
12 ) ___________MINUTES How much time did you spend getting to the source
o f music you obtained (travel time to store, web surfing time, calling friends, etc.)?
13 ) ___________MINUTES How much time did vou spend actually acquiring
this music (checkout time, browsing time, burning time, download time, etc.)?
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14) MINUTES If  you borrowed audio music from the library.
friend, etc, and copied onto a personal source (e.g. CD, tape, computer) please add the 
time you spent returning the audio music.
The following questions relate to your attitudes — please m ark vertically on the scale on 
where your attitude fits with the question. (W hen we say “free” music we do not mean 
promotional, streaming radio, or music provided by the artist for free.)
15) How much do you enjoy music? 
Dislike Music 
-10
I-----------------------------1-----------------
0
4 -
Very Much Enjoy 
10 1
16) How much do you enjoy copying your own tapes or CD’s? 
Dislike
-10 0 
I-----------------------------1-----------------------------1-------------------------
Very Much Enjoy 
10
 1
17) How much does marketing (e.g. packaging, lyrics, posters, fan clubs, etc.) influence 
your purchase o f  audio music?
No Influence Great Influence
-10  0  10 
I-----------------------------1-----------------------------1-----------------------------1-----------------------------1
18)1 use the web to discover new music. 
Never 
-10
I-----------------------------1-----------------------
0
-+ ■
Always 
10 
 1
19) How comfortable are you using a computer? 
Uncomfortable 
-10 0 
I 1-----------------------------1----
Comfortable
10
 1
20) I am good at finding free music on the Internet. 
Strongly Disagree 
-10 0 
I 1-----------------------------1--------
Strongly Agree 
10
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21)1 am good at finding paid music on the Internet.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
-10  0  10 
I- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - — I- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1
22) How would you rate the quality o f the sound on the last recording you acquired (not 
the artist)?
Terrible Outstanding
-10  0  10 
I- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1
23) How fair is the amount recording artists earn?
Very undeserved Very deserved
-10  0 10 I-------------------------- 1-------------------------- 1-------------------------- 1-------------------------- 1
24) How would you rate your attitude towards the recording industry?
Highly unfavorable Highly favorable
-10  0  10 I-------------------------- 1-------------------------- 1-------------------------- 1-------------------------- 1
25) No one is harmed when people copy music.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
-10  0  10 
I- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1
26) The fact that m any other people download music for free makes it ok for me to do it. 
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
-10  0  10 
I- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1
27) Recently some people have been prosecuted for copying music without permission. 
W hat is your opinion about them being prosecuted?
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
-10  0  10 
I- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1
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28) Acquiring individual songs o f choice is better than acquiring a full album/CD. 
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
-10  0 10 
I- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1
29) There could be risks such as bad quality or a virus from downloading unpaid music. 
How do you perceive such risks?
None Great
0 10 
I----------------------------1----------------------------1
30) If  you illegally attained music, what is your chance o f  getting caught?
None
0
I- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - -
Great
10 
 1
31) I f  you should steal music and got caught, how severe do you think your penalty 
would be?
None Great
0 10
I----------------------------1----------------------------1
32) How ethical is it to copy music without permission? 
Unethical
-10  0
I---------------------------- 1-----------------------------1---------------
Completely Ethical 
10
4-----------------------------1
33) Do you have a major credit card/debit (e.g. Master Card, Visa)?
 Yes
 No
34) How comfortable are you using the card to make on-line purchases?
Very Uncomfortable Completely Comfortable
-10  0 10 I------------------------ 1------------------------ 1------------------------ 1------------------------ 1
35) W hat is your age?
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36) W hat is your gender?
 Male
 Female
37 ) _____________ Years o f formal education (e.g. 1 year college = 1 3  years)?
38) W hat is your household income?
 Less than $25,000
 $25,000 - $50,000
 More than $50,000
39 ) _____ Number o f  people in your household
40) Do you rent or own your dwelling?
 Rent
 Own
41 )  Interviewer Name
42 ) ____________Neighborhood Number
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Appendix B 
VARIABLE SOURCES
This appendix discusses the source o f  the variables measured for each model in
the same order the models are presented in the text. First, recall that the Becker model
includes the following variables: Caught, Penalty, Age, Gender, Edu, Lowinc, Medinc,
House, and Rent. Every data point used for the analysis presented here comes from
individual responses to specific questions on the questionnaire.
Caught = question 30
Penalty = question 31
Age = question 35
Gender = question 36
Edu = question 37
Lowinc = question 38
Medinc = question 39
House = question 40
The Theory o f  Reasoned Action requires some calculation for the variables as
they are created using several different questions. Recall that variables necessary to test
this model are Attitude and Norms. Attitude was calculated by taking an average o f the
individual’s beliefs about the music industry (question 24) and music artists (question
23). The result is believed to capture the individual’s feelings toward the people or firms
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harm ed by theft. This result is added to the individuals personally held beliefs about the 
legitimacy o f music theft, believed to be captured by the average o f  three factors: (1) 
W hether they believe music theft causes harm to other (question 25), (2) their belief 
regarding the fairness o f  being prosecuted (question 27), and (3) the personal ethical 
belief o f  the individual towards theft (question 32). The following formula shows how 
attitude was computed:
Attitude = 1/2 (question 23 + question24) +
l/3((question25*-l) + (question!?) + (question32)*-l)
This formula produces a number in the range o f -20 to 20. Question 25 and 32 are 
multiplied by negative one for proper scaling (e.g., so negative 20 represents the most 
permissive attitude toward theft).
The variable Norms is also multiplied by a negative one. Thus, the smaller the 
response the more likely the individual is to steal. Norms comes from the respondent’s 
answer to question 26 only.
The augmented Becker model uses the same variables as the Becker model and 
the Theory o f  Reasoned Action. No changes are made in their computation from the 
description above.
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